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Top–Down Attentional Control in Parkinsonʼs Disease:
Salient Considerations
Roshan Cools1, Robert Rogers2, Roger A. Barker3,
and Trevor W. Robbins4
Abstract
■ Cognitive dysfunction in Parkinsonʼs disease (PD) has been
hypothesized to reflect a failure of cortical control. In keeping
with this hypothesis, some of the cognitive deficits in PD resem-
ble those seen in patients with lesions in the lateral pFC, which
has been associated with top–down attentional control. How-
ever, there is no direct evidence for a failure of top–down control
mechanisms in PD. Here we fill this gap by demonstrating dis-
proportionate control by bottom–up attention to dimensional
salience during attentional set shifting. Patients needed signifi-
cantly more trials to criterion than did controls when shifting to
a low-salient dimension while, remarkably, needing significantly
fewer trials to criterion than did controls when shifting to a high-
salient dimension. Thus, attention was captured by bottom–up
attention to salient information to a greater extent in patients than
in controls. The results provide a striking reinterpretation of prior
set-shifting data and provide the first direct evidence for a failure
of top–down attentional control, resembling that seen after cate-
cholamine depletion in the pFC. ■
INTRODUCTION
Parkinsonʼs disease (PD) is accompanied by cognitive defi-
cits, even in the earliest stages of the disease (Cools, 2006;
Dubois et al., 1995; Owen et al., 1992, 1995; Brown &
Marsden, 1988b). Some of these deficits resemble those
seen in patients with lesions in the lateral pFC (Owen
et al., 1992, 1995). For example, both PD and lateral frontal
lesion patients exhibit a set-shifting deficit on Wisconsin
Card Sort-like tests (Owen, Roberts, Polkey, Sahakian, &
Robbins, 1991; Taylor, Saint-Cyr, & Lang, 1986; Cools, Van
Den Bercken, Horstink, Van Spaendonck, & Berger, 1984;
Lees & Smith, 1983; Bowen, Kamienny, Burns, & Yahr,
1975; Milner, 1963, 1964), such as the intradimensional/
extradimensional (ID/ED) set-shifting paradigm (Cools,
Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2001b; Owen et al., 1993;
Downes et al., 1989). Set-shifting impairment and other
frontal lobe-like abnormalities have been associated
with a failure of top–down control mechanisms (Miller &
DʼEsposito, 2005; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Dias, Robbins, &
Roberts, 1996; Milner, 1963, 1964). Although top–down
control mechanisms are ill defined, they generally refer
to selective attention processes that enable goal-directed,
internally driven decisions and help the organism to over-
come externally driven decisions based on stimulus sa-
lience and novelty (Gazzaley & DʼEsposito, 2007). The
hypothesis that PD is characterized by a failure of top–down
control is consistent with classic theorizing about set-
shifting deficits in PD, according to which they reflect prob-
lems with “internal” attentional control, leading to exces-
sive guidance of behavior by “external cues” (Brown &
Marsden, 1988a; Cools et al., 1984; Barbeau, 1973). How-
ever, there is no direct evidence for a failure of top–down
control underlying set-shifting deficits in PD. Here we fill
this gap by demonstrating disproportionate control by
bottom–up attention to dimensional salience during atten-
tional set shifting.
In the attentional set-shifting paradigm, subjects discrim-
inate between two patterns according to one of two stim-
ulus dimensions (e.g., shapes or lines). During the critical
extradimensional set-shifting (EDS) stage of the task, sub-
jects shift their attention from a previously relevant dimen-
sion to a newly relevant dimension. Performance generally
declines at these EDS stages relative to the earlier set for-
mation and maintenance stages and disproportionately so
in PD patients. Here we manipulated the bottom–up sa-
lience of the stimulus dimensions. Dimensional salience
was established using a sorting task in a separate experi-
ment with young healthy volunteers. This separate study
(reported below) revealed that the salience (or attention-
drawing capacity) of the shape and color of a stimulus was
greater than that of the angle of a stimulus. Accordingly, in
the subsequent set-shifting experiment, patients and age-
matched controls were assigned to either a high-salient
shape/color condition or a low-salient angle/color condi-
tion (relevant dimension italicized). This design allowed
us to test whether the set-shifting deficit in PD depends
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on bottom–up dimensional salience and, thus, reflects a
failure of control by top–down attention.
In addition, the design also enabled us to investigate
an alternative hypothesis regarding the mechanism under-
lying the set-shifting deficit in PD. This alternative hypoth-
esis is based on previous data (Slabosz et al., 2006; Owen
et al., 1993; but see Myers et al., 2003; Gauntlett-Gilbert,
Roberts,&Brown, 1999; Van Spaendonck, Berger, Horstink,
Borm, & Cools, 1995), which have suggested that the
set-shifting deficit in PD reflects enhanced learned irrele-
vance (LI). Learned irrelevance refers to an inability to at-
tend to and learn about information that was previously
irrelevant (Mackintosh, 1975) and has been contrasted
with perseveration (PE), that is, an inability to disengage
from a previously relevant dimension. Owen et al. (1993)
argued that set-shifting deficits must result either from en-
hanced LI or from PE. To investigate this issue in PD, they
decomposed the original attentional set-shifting paradigm
into two tasks. At the postshift stage of the LI task, the pre-
viously relevant dimension was replaced with a novel di-
mension. Accordingly, PE was not possible. Any set-shifting
deficit, they argued, must reflect enhanced LI. Conversely,
at the postshift stage of the PE task, the previously irrel-
evant dimension was replaced. Any set-shifting deficit in
this task could not reflect enhanced LI but must rather re-
flect PE. Mild medicated PD patients performed poorly
only on the LI task while performing like normal controls
on the PE task. This initial study, which suggested that the
set-shifting deficit in (medicated) PD reflects enhanced LI,
was followed up by a series of similar studies. Some of
these replicated the originally obtained selectively en-
hanced LI (Slabosz et al., 2006; Lewis, Slabosz, Robbins,
Barker, & Owen, 2005). However, other studies observed
findings that were not consistent with enhanced LI (Myers
et al., 2003; Gauntlett-Gilbert et al., 1999; Van Spaendonck
et al., 1995). Therefore, we reasoned that the deficit might
surface only in certain conditions. Specifically, we hypoth-
esized that enhanced LImight be particularly pronounced,
when demands for suppression of the irrelevant dimen-
sion are high. Thus, LI would be a function of the degree
to which such irrelevant information was processed be-
fore shifting, that is, of the salience of preshift (ir)relevant
dimensions.
In sum, the aim of the present study was to assess
whether the set-shifting deficit in PD reflects (i) abnormal
control by bottom–up salience or (ii) enhanced LI. To this
end, we employed a 2 × 2 factorial design with the follow-
ing four conditions: a high-salient LI task, a low-salient
LI task, a high-salient PE task, and a low-salient PE task
(Table 1). If the set-shifting deficit reflects abnormal con-
trol by bottom–up salience, then it would surface as a
salience-dependent deficit in the PE condition, in which
salience was manipulated at the postshift stages (Table 1).
By contrast, if the set-shifting deficit reflects enhanced LI,
then it would surface as a salience-dependent deficit in
the LI condition, in which salience was manipulated at the
preshift stages.
The results provide clear support for the former and
not the latter hypothesis. The deficit was modulated by
salience in the PE condition, and not in the LI condition.
These data suggest that the deficit in tasks of LI observed
in previous studies might actually reflect disproportionate
control by bottom–up attention to a salient dimension. In-
deed the previously used tasks confounded LI with dimen-
sional salience, given that they required subjects to attend
to a familiar, thus less salient, dimension and to ignore a
novel, thus more salient, dimension. Accordingly, the LI
deficit might have originated from an inability to overcome
capture by a highly salient, currently irrelevant dimension
due to a failure to exert top–down control. Such an account
differs qualitatively from the alternative hypothesis that it
reflects an inability to overcome enhanced LI specifically
associated with the previously irrelevant, now relevant
dimension.
METHODS
Subjects
Eighty-two mild to moderate PD patients (31 women) (as
defined using UK Parkinsonʼs Disease Brain Bank crite-
ria) and 50 age- and IQ-matched elderly control subjects
(30 women) participated in the experiment. The Hoehn
and Yahr stage ranged from I to IV in the onmedication state
(where applicable) (mean ± SEM = 2.0 ± 0.06; 12 stage
1.0, 9 stage 1.5, 39 stage 2.0, 13 stage 2.5, 8 stage 3, and
1 stage 4). All, except seven never-medicated patients
(two in the high-salient PE group, two in the low-salient
LI group, and three in the high-salient LI group), were
receiving daily L-dopa preparations, dopamine receptor
agonists, and/or selegiline (a monoamine oxidase inhib-
itor). Six patients received anticholinergic medication
(one in the high-salient PE group, three in the low-salient
LI group, and two in the high-salient LI group). Three pa-
tients received antidepressant medication (all in the high-
salient PE group). All were stable on their doses for at least
3 months before testing. None of the patients were de-
mented [Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) >24] or
clinically depressed.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four con-
ditions (see below and Table 1). Table 2 shows the number
of subjects attempting the critical EDS stage of each condi-
tion and the number of subjects starting each condition.
Table 1. Conditions
Condition Task Preshift Dimensions Postshift Dimensions
Low salient PE Color, number Angle, color
High salient PE Color, number Shape, color
Low salient LI Angle, color Color, number
High salient LI Shape, color Color, number
Relevant dimensions are italicized.
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Demographic characteristics and performance on back-
ground tests of pattern and spatial recognition memory
(from the CANTAB battery [Sahakian et al., 1988]); the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI [Beck, Ward, Mendelson,
Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961]); the MMSE (Folstein, Folstein, &
McHugh, 1975); and the National Adult Reading Test (NART
[Nelson, 1982]) are presented in Table 3. There were no
significant differences between patients and controls, ex-
cept on the BDI, F(1,113) = 20.5, p< .001, where patients
had higher scores than controls. Patients also made more
errors on the spatial recognition memory test than did
controls, F(1,116) = 6.6, p = .01. However, there was no
three-way interaction between group, task, and dimen-
sional salience on any of these measures, indicating that
the critical interaction effects of interest (see below) do
not reflect differences between subgroups (divided across
the different task conditions) in terms of performance on
the background tests. Similarly there were no two-way in-
teractions between task and dimensional salience, that is,
between the four PD patient subgroups [Task × Salience
interactions for age, F(1,78) = 0.02; NART, F(1, 78) = 0.2;
UPDRS, F(1,78) = 0.06; Hoehn and Yahr, F(1,78) = 0.3].
Together with the relatively normal performance of the
patients on the initial stages of the attentional set-shifting
tasks (see below and Figure 4) [for example, no main effect
of group, F(1,124) = 0.4, p = .5, and no Group × Stage ×
Salience interaction, F(1,124) = 0.06, p = .8, for trials to
criterion (TTC) at the simplediscrimination (SD) stage], these
data show that performance at the critical EDS stages of
the tasks could be examined in the context of relatively
matched global cognitive function.
Procedure
A 2 × 2 factorial between-subjects design was employed
with four separate conditions (see Table 1). Like the stan-
dard CANTAB ID/ED set-shifting paradigm, this paradigm
consisted of a series of stages (see Figures 1 and 2), start-
ing with an SD task. During this SD stage, subjects were
presented two abstract one-dimensional visual patterns
(i.e., two shapes) and had to learn by trial and error, based
on performance feedback, which of the two patterns was
Table 2. Sample Sizes
Condition Task Patients Controls
Low salient PE 15/15 13/13
High salient PE 15/15 13/14
Low salient LI 23/27 11/12
High salient LI 25/25 11/11
Data represent the total number of subjects attempting the critical EDS
stage/the total number of subjects starting the task.
Table 3. Demographic and Background Characteristics
Age Hoehn and Yahr UPDRS NART MMSE BDI
Pattern
Recognition Memory
Spatial
Recognition Memory
Perseveration
Low salient
PD 62.1 (1.8) 1.77 (0.14) 29.4 (3.8) 110.3 (2.8) 29.3 (0.3) 9.3 (1.6) 21.1 (0.8) 15.5 (0.5)
CS 61.8 (2.6) Na Na 116.9 (1.7) 29.2 (0.3) 5.1 (0.7) 21.1 (0.8) 16.3 (0.8)
High salient
PD 64.5 (1.9) 2.07 (0.15) 37.0 (4.6) 111.7 (2.4) 28.7 (0.4) 10 (1.6) 19.7 (0.8) 14.3 (0.5)
CS 62.3 (2.2) Na 113.9 (2.4) 28.4 (0.6) 3.3 (1.0) 21.2 (0.6) 16.2 (0.6)
Learned irrelevance
Low salient
PD 61.8 (2.2) 1.98 (0.12) 34.8 (3.1) 115.6 (1.6) 28.9 (0.24) 9.1 (1.1) 20 (0.5) 15.4 (0.4)
CS 61.4 (3.0) Na 115 (2.0) 28.5 (0.4) 5.9 (1.4) 20.6 (1.1) 14.8 (1.1)
High salient
PD 63.6 (1.5) 2.12 (0.12) 44.3 (4.0) 115.1 (1.88) 29.4 (0.3) 7.8 (1.1) 19.7 (0.7) 14.3 (0.4)
CS 59.7 (2.7) Na 118.5 (1.6) 29.3 (0.2) 3 (0.7) 19.2 (1.2) 16.8 (0.6)
Data represent means (SEM ); eight control data points missing for the spatial recognition memory test; four control data points missing for the
pattern recognition memory test; four patient data points and seven control data points missing for the BDI (Beck et al., 1961); two patient data
points and seven control data points missing for the MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975); and one control data point missing for the National Adult Reading
Test (Nelson, 1982). PD = Parkinsonʼs disease; CS = control subjects.
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correct. After subjects obtained a learning criterion of six
consecutive correct responses, the task proceeded to the
next stage, the SD reversal stage. In this stage, the stimulus-
reward contingencies were reversed so that the previously
correct pattern now became incorrect, whereas the pre-
viously incorrect pattern became correct. Subjects had to
shift responding from one exemplar pattern to the other
exemplar pattern. In the third stage, the compound dis-
crimination (CD) stage, a second dimension (e.g., color),
was introduced, but subjects had to ignore this new di-
mension and continue attending to the previously relevant
dimension. Following a fourth CD reversal (CDR) stage,
in which the stimulus-reward contingencies of the orig-
inal dimension reversed once more, the task proceeded
to an intradimensional shift (IDS) stage, at which new
exemplars of both dimensions were introduced. Subjects
still had to respond according to the original dimension
(e.g., shape) and to ignore the other irrelevant dimension
(e.g., color). The sixth stage, the intradimensional reversal
(IDR) stage, in which the stimulus-reward contingencies
of the original dimension were reversed, was followed
by the critical EDS stage, at which point subjects had to
shift attentional set and start responding according to a
newly relevant dimension (e.g., number). A final reversal
of stimulus-reward contingencies occurred at the eighth
ED reversal stage.
For each stage, the learning criterion was set to six
consecutive correct trials, after which the task proceeded
to the next stage. If this criterion was not reached after
50 trials, then the test terminated automatically. A “total
change” design was employed in which both the IDS and
the EDS were made in the presence of novel exemplars
of the two dimensions. The task took approximately
25 min.
Subjects were assigned to either an LI task or a PE task.
As in the study by Owen et al. (1993), the LI task (Figure 1)
emphasized the requirement to shift attention to the pre-
viously irrelevant dimension, whereas the PE task (Fig-
ure 2) emphasized the requirement to shift attention
away from the previously relevant dimension. In the LI
task, the preshift relevant dimension was replaced with a
novel dimension at the EDS stage to prevent PE. The pre-
shift irrelevant dimension became the relevant dimension
at the EDS stage of the LI task. In the PE task, the preshift
irrelevant dimension was replaced with a novel dimension
at the EDS stage to prevent LI. The preshift relevant di-
mension became the irrelevant dimension at the EDS
stage of the PE task.
Subjects were assigned to either the high-salient shape/
color condition (Figures 1 and 2, right panels) or the low-
salient angle/color condition (Figures 1 and 2, left panels).
Dimensional salience was manipulated at preshift stages
in the LI tasks and at postshift stages in the PE tasks, so
that in the LI tasks, any difference in performance between
conditions at the EDS stage can only reflect differences in
the pre-EDS stages.
We assessed dimensional salience in a separate experi-
ment by using a speeded classification task, which required
subjects to sort one- and two-dimensional sample stimuli
to one of two test stimuli according to a one-dimensional
rule as fast as possible (Gottwald & Garner, 1975; Garner
& Felfoldy, 1970). For the two-dimensional stimuli, the
Figure 1. Correct and incorrect stimulus exemplars in the high-salient
(right panel) and the low-salient (left panel) conditions of the LI tasks.
Figure 2. Correct and incorrect stimulus exemplars in the high-salient
(right panel) and the low-salient (left panel) conditions of the PE tasks.
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dimensions were paired orthogonally, thus requiring selec-
tive attention to the currently relevant dimension. Com-
parison of the sorting of the different two-dimensional
stimuli with each other as well as with the sorting of the
one-dimensional stimuli enabled us to test the hypothesis
that the dimension angle was less salient than the dimen-
sions color and shape. Specifically, we predicted that the
sorting of one-dimensional angle stimuli would be more
difficult than the sorting of one-dimensional color and
shape stimuli. In addition, we predicted that the sorting of
two-dimensional angle/color stimuli (relevant dimension
italicized) would be more difficult than the sorting of two-
dimensional color/angle stimuli. Conversely, we predicted
that there would be no difference between sorting shape/
color and color/shape stimuli. Twenty-three nonmedicated
young healthy volunteers (Cambridge undergraduates)
participated in this experiment. Each subject performed
seven blocks, each block consisting of twenty trials. The first
three blocks required the sorting of one-dimensional stim-
uli according to color, shape, or angle (order randomized
between subjects). The last four blocks required the sorting
of two-dimensional stimuli according to (i) color while
ignoring angle, (ii) angle while ignoring color, (iii) shape
while ignoring color, and (iv) color while ignoring shape.
Subjects were presented a stimulus inside a box located at
Figure 3. Means of median RTs (msec) are shown for each of the
seven sorting tasks. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
Figure 4. The number of TTC
for each of the eight stages
of the PE tasks (A) and the
LI tasks (B) as a function of
dimensional salience (a/c =
angle/color [low salient]; s/c =
shape/color [high salient])
and group (PD = patients
with Parkinsonʼs disease; CS =
age- and education-matched
controls). SD = simple
discrimination; SDR = simple
discrimination reversal;
CD = compound discrimination;
CDR = compound
discrimination reversal; IDS =
intradimensional shift;
IDR = intradimensional
reversal; EDS= extradimensional
set shift; EDR=extradimensional
reversal. Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean.
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the top of the computer screen and were asked to sort it
into one of two lower boxes by touching that box as fast
as possible according to an instructed task dimension
(e.g., shape).
Stimuli and Material
AnAdvantech PPC-120T-RT computerwith a touch-sensitive
screen for recording responses was used as a testing ma-
chine. On each trial of the adapted ID/ED set-shifting para-
digm, two stimuli were presented randomly within two of
four boxes (10.5 cm wide and 5 cm high) on a black back-
ground. The distance between the top and the bottom box
was 7 cm. The distance between the left and the right
box was 3.8 cm. Angle stimulus pairs were always vertical
and horizontal or 45° clockwise and 45° anticlockwise (Fig-
ure 1). Shape stimulus pairs were always a circle and a tri-
angle or a cross and a rough quarter of a circle. The default
shape value (used for angle/color and color/number stim-
uli) was a square. The numbers of exemplars presented for
number stimuli were always three and six or two and five
(Figure 1). The default number value was four. Color stim-
ulus pairs were always red and orange, blue and green, or
cyan and magenta. The default value was red. The two ex-
emplars of the irrelevant dimension were always paired
pseudorandomly with those of the relevant dimension
so that the same pairing did not occur on more than three
successive trials. The exact sequences of stimuli are given
in Figures 1 (LI) and 2 (PE). An incorrect response was fol-
lowed by the word “wrong” in red, presented in the center
of the screen. The word was accompanied by the outline
of the touched box turning red and a low-pitch tone. A cor-
rect response was followed by the word “correct” in green;
the touched box turning green and a high-pitch tone.
Data Analysis
Sorting Task
Median RTs were calculated and preferred over mean RTs
due to reduced sensitivity to outliers. They were sub-
mitted to a series of repeated measures ANOVAs, after
log10 transformation (as is appropriate when data are
positively skewed as is the case with RT data; Howell,
1997, p. 325) and exclusion of RTs >2000 msec, error
trials, and the first trial of each block.
Attentional Set-shifting Task
On the basis of our a priori hypothesis that attentional set
shifting in PD depends on demands for selective atten-
tion (i.e., dimensional salience), we focused our analyses
on the two stages of the paradigm that were expressly
designed to investigate these processes: the CD stage,
where the second irrelevant dimension is first introduced,
and the EDS stage, where subjects have to shift between
dimensions. The main performance measure was the
mean number of trials to criterion (TTC), which were
square root transformed [√x + 0.5] to stabilize variances
as is appropriate when the mean is proportional to the
variance, for example, when data are in the form of counts
(Howell, 1997, p. 327). These data were analyzed using re-
peated measures ANOVAs, with stage as the within-subject
factor and group (patients vs. controls), dimensional sa-
lience (angle/color vs. shape/color), and task (PE vs. LI) as
between-subject factors. Partial eta squared values (η2; cal-
culated using SPSS) represent the proportion of the total
variance that is attributed to the effect and were calculated
as the ratio of the effect variance (SSeffect) to the total var-
iance (SStotal). For simplicity, the error data and the failure
rate data are not reported, as they revealed the same pat-
tern of results.
RESULTS
Effect of Dimensional Salience on Speeded Sorting
The performance of young volunteers (n = 23) on the
seven sorting tasks is presented in Figure 3. Subjects
sorted one-dimensional angle-stimuli significantly more
slowly relative to both one-dimensional color stimuli,
F(1,22) = 13.4, p = .001, η2 = 0.4, and one-dimensional
shape stimuli, F(1,22) = 19.0, p < .0001, η2 = 0.5,
whereas there was no difference in sorting speed be-
tween the one-dimensional shape and the color blocks,
F(1,22) = 0.2, p = .6, η2 = 0.01. In addition, subjects
sorted angle/color stimuli significantly more slowly than
color/angle stimuli, F(1,22) = 12.5, p = .005, η2 = 0.4.
Conversely, there was no difference in sorting speed be-
tween the shape/color and color/shape blocks, F(1,22) =
0.4, p = .5, η2 = 0.02. These results confirmed our pre-
dictions and indicated that the dimension angle was less
salient than the dimensions color and shape.
Effects of Dimensional Salience on Attentional
Set-shifting in PD
In Figure 4, we present shifting difficulty as a function of
group, dimensional salience, and task (LI vs. PE). As ex-
pected, the performance pattern of patients was signifi-
cantly different from that of controls, particularly at the
Table 4. Mean TTC at the Compound Discrimination Stage
PD Patients Controls
Low-salient PE 6.4 (0.2)a 9.5 (1.9)
High-salient PE 11.1 (1.5) 7.1 (0.6)
Low-salient LI 12.9 (2.0)b 14.7 (3.6)
High-salient LI 8.2 (0.6) 9.5 (0.8)
Values represent means (SEM ).
aSignificantly different from the high-salient PE condition.
bSignificantly different from the high-salient LI condition.
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EDS stage, but the difference depended on dimensional
salience and task, as evidenced by a significant Group ×
Stage × Salience interaction, F(1,124) = 5.9, p= .02, η2 =
0.05, and a strong trend toward a significant four-way
Group × Stage × Salience × Task interaction, F(1,124) =
3.7, p = .056, η2 = 0.03. There was also a main effect
of stage, F(1,124) = 100.1, p < .0001, η2 = 0.45, and a
Group × Stage × Task interaction, F(1,124) = 19.6, p <
.0001, η2 = 0.14. Breakdown of the four-way interaction re-
vealed that the Group × Stage × Salience interaction was
significant for the PE task, F(1,53)=9.3, p= .004,η2=0.15,
but not for the LI task, F(1,71) = 0.1, p = .7, η2 = 0.002.
In fact, there was no effect of group on the LI task at all
at any stage (all ps > .2).
Further breakdown of the significant Group × Stage ×
Salience interaction in the PE task revealed that patients
needed significantly more TTC at the EDS stage (relative
to the CD stage) in the angle/color condition than in the
shape/color condition (a Stage × Salience interaction),
F(1,28) = 40.6, p < .0001, η2 = 0.6 (Figure 4). This ef-
fect of dimensional salience was not present in controls,
F(1,25) = 0.5, p = .5, η2 = 0.02. A group difference was
also evident when patients and controls were compared
directly for the conditions separately: Patients needed
more TTC at the EDS stage (relative to the CD stage)
than controls in the angle/color condition (a significant
Group × Stage interaction), F(1,26) = 4.1, p = .05, η2 =
0.14. Conversely, they needed fewer TTC than controls in
the shape/color condition, F(1,27) = 5.8, p = .023, η2 =
0.18 (Figure 4).
Simple main effects analyses revealed a significant effect
of salience in the patient group at both the EDS and the
CD stages (Figure 4A and Table 4): At the EDS stage, pa-
tients in the angle/color PE condition needed significantly
more TTC than patients in the shape/color PE condition,
F(1,28) = 32.0, p < .0001, η2 = 0.5. Conversely, at the CD
stage, patients in the angle/color PE condition needed sig-
nificantly fewer TTC than patients in the shape/color con-
dition, F(1,28) = 11.7, p = .002, η2 = 0.3. These simple
main effects of salience were not significant in the control
group (both p > .2).
The significant effect of salience at the CD stage of the
PE task in the patient group (Figure 4A and Table 4) was
surprising because the CD stages of the two PE condi-
tions were identical (the locus of the salience manipula-
tion was at postshift stages). Accordingly, this difference
likely reflects a sample bias. However, there were no sig-
nificant differences between the shape/color and the
angle/color patient groups on any of the background
neuropsychological tests (Table 3). Nevertheless, we
considered the possibility that the effect of dimensional
salience at the EDS stage in the patients reflected an in-
cidental difference in set formation and/or maintenance
at the CD stage. Indeed, one might expect that it is easier
to shift away from a poorly formed and maintained set
than to shift from a well-formed and well-maintained
set. We rejected this hypothesis based on the following
two findings. First, performance was well matched be-
tween the two patient groups at the IDS and the IDR
stages (both Fs < 1.3, both ps > .3), which directly pre-
ceded the EDS stage. This finding indicates that there was
no incidental difference in set-maintenance immediately
before shifting. Second, the critical significant difference
in EDS performance between patients in the angle/color
condition and patients in the shape/color condition re-
mained highly significant even after covarying for perfor-
mance at the CD stage, F(1,27) = 19.9, p< .0001, η2 = 0.4.
In summary, these data show that the parkinsonian
EDS deficit depends on dimensional salience. Patients ex-
hibited a significant deficit when shifting to a low-salient
dimension. By contrast, they exhibited a significant ben-
efit when shifting to a high-salient dimension. These
salience-dependent effects were restricted to the post-
shift stages of the PE task, in which the salience of the
previously relevant dimension remained constant. Thus,
the salience-dependent effects cannot reflect dispropor-
tionate PE to that previously relevant dimension but must
reflect abnormal differential processing of the novel, newly
relevant dimensions angle versus shape. The salience-
dependent effects of PD did not extend to postshift stages
of the LI task, indicating that they also do not reflect en-
hanced LI.
DISCUSSION
We demonstrate that the attentional set-shifting deficit in
mild medicated PD patients was present only when they
were required to shift to a low-salience attentional set. By
contrast, patients were significantly better than controls
at shifting to a high-salience attentional set. This perfor-
mance pattern shows that impaired set shifting in PD
does not reflect nonspecific changes in motivation, arousal,
or fatigue. Instead the results reveal that, after shifting,
attention was captured by salient information to a greater
extent in patients than in controls, indicative of exagger-
ated bottom–up and/or attenuated top–down attentional
control in PD. We hypothesize that this disproportionate
bottom–up control is a result of a failure of top–down
control. This hypothesis builds on the principle of competi-
tive interactions between top–down and bottom–up con-
trol processes (Einhäuser, Rutishauser, & Koch, 2008), is
grounded in anatomical evidence about the primary locus
of parkinsonian pathology (Agid et al., 1993; Kish, Shannak,
& Hornykiewicz, 1988; Farley, Price, & Hornykiewicz,
1977), and parallels similar interpretations of identical per-
formance patterns observed in monkeys with prefrontal
neurochemical lesions (see below; Crofts et al., 2001).
The selective deficit in the low-salient condition is con-
sistent with the robust finding that PD patients exhibit
difficulty at the EDS stage of the original ID/ED set-shifting
paradigm of the CANTAB battery, in which subjects have
to shift from a highly salient shape dimension to a less sa-
lient line dimension (Cools, Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins,
2001a; Owen et al., 1992, 1995; Downes et al., 1989).
854 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 22, Number 5
These prior studies had already revealed that a significant
proportion of PD patients also failed to complete the early
set formation (CD) stage of the task (e.g., Owen et al.,
1992; Downes et al., 1989), already indicating that the
deficit might reflect a failure of a more general (learn-
ing, selective attention, or control) mechanism than of
set shifting specifically. Furthermore, it concurs with defi-
cits on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Grant & Berg,
1948), a concept formation task, in which subjects are pre-
sented with three-dimensional stimuli. In this task, con-
cept formation and shifting require the selection of one
of two alternative, competing dimensions. The presence
of a choice between dimensions might well reduce the
salience (i.e., attention drawing capacity) of the newly re-
levant dimension. The data are also reminiscent of tradi-
tional accounts of set-shifting deficits, which attribute
them to problems with “internal” attentional control, lead-
ing to excessive guidance of behavior by “external cues”
(Van Spaendonck et al., 1995; Brown & Marsden, 1988a;
Cools et al., 1984; Barbeau, 1973). Specifically, several
studies have indicated that PD patients exhibit greater dif-
ficulty with directing attention based on internal attentional
cues than external attentional cues (Brown & Marsden,
1990), not only in high-level cognitive tasks, as shown here,
but also as measured with simple choice RT tasks and in
the domain of movement ( Jahanshahi et al., 1995). Here
we provide direct evidence for the hypothesis that dispro-
portionate control by bottom–up salience also accounts for
the set-shifting deficit in PD; in fact, the deficit is observed
only when control by bottom–up salience is detrimental
for set shifting.
In the present study, the performance benefit for the
high-salient over the low-salient dimension did not ex-
tend to performance at the preshift formation and/or
maintenance stages (of the LI task). One might have pre-
dicted that disproportionate control by bottom–up atten-
tion would have also enhanced the impact of dimensional
salience at the CD stage. In fact, although there was no
significant Group × Condition interaction at the CD stage
of the LI task, supplementary analyses revealed that a di-
mensional salience effect at the CD stage was significant
only for PD patients, F(1,50) = 4.8, p = .03, η2 = 0.09,
and not for controls, F(1,21) = 1.2, p = .3, η2 = 0.05. This
post hoc analysis indicates that the predicted group effect
at the CD stage may be present but simply not sufficiently
large to reveal disproportionate control by bottom–up
attention in patients relative to controls. This is perhaps
not surprising, given that the preceding SD stages already
forced selective attention to the relevant dimension, thus
reducing the impact of differential salience of the irrel-
evant dimension. Indeed, prior data indicate that catego-
ry learning in PD patients is impacted to a greater extent
than controls when the number of randomly varying irrel-
evant dimensions increases (Filoteo, Maddox, Ing, Zizak,
& Song, 2005). Also consistent are findings that mild medi-
cated PD patients are impaired in the identification of the
dimensions of five-dimensional stimuli (Swainson et al.,
2006). Increases in the number of dimensions might well
reduce the salience of each dimension.
The observation that responding was controlled by
bottom–up dimensional salience to a greater extent in
PD, which is characterized by severe striatal dopamine
depletion, apparently contrasts with the hypothesis that
striatal dopamine promotes switching to salient, biologi-
cally relevant events (Redgrave, Prescott, & Gurney, 1999).
According to this hypothesis, PD should be characterized
by reduced rather than enhanced ability to switch to salient
information. One possibility is that our finding actually re-
flects enhanced striatal dopamine as a result of the dopa-
minergic medication taken by the majority of patients. This
hypothesis would concur with current models of striatal
dopamine function (Gruber, Dayan, Gutkin, & Solla, 2006;
Frank, 2005) and should be tested in a future controlled
medicationwithdrawal study.However, attentional set shift-
ing has previously been shown to be insensitive to dopa-
minergic medication in PD (Slabosz et al., 2006; Lewis
et al., 2005; Cools et al., 2001a;Owenet al., 1993), which acts
primarily by restoring striatal dopamine levels (Maruyama,
Naoi, & Narabayashi, 1996; Hornykiewicz, 1974). Therefore,
we argue that it is more likely that the disproportionate
control by bottom–up attention reflects an abnormality
that does not involve striatal dopamine. Indeed there is
evidence that different forms of switching implicate dis-
tinct cortical and subcortical mechanisms. Specifically,
we have previously shown that the striatum is active and
required only for switching between concrete stimulus
exemplars but not for switching between abstract rules
that have no direct instantiation in the motor or sensory
domain (such as match or nonmatch rules) (Cools, Ivry,
& DʼEsposito, 2006; Cools, Clark, & Robbins, 2004). By
contrast, the control of abstract (match and nonmatch)
rules has been associated with prefrontal cortical mecha-
nisms (Wallis, Anderson, & Miller, 2001). Accordingly, the
presently observed deficit in shifting between abstract di-
mensions may reflect an abnormality in nondopaminergic
cortical mechanisms. Consistent with this hypothesis are
recent data showing that mild PD patients are not im-
paired on a task-switching paradigm that requires the
switching of both stimulus and response sets due to ab-
stract rule changes (i.e., from judging letters as vowels or
consonants to judging numbers as higher or lower than
5) (Kehagia, Cools, Barker, & Robbins, 2009). This find-
ing contrasted with results from our other task-switching
studies (Cools, Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003; Cools
et al., 2001a, 2001b), which revealed consistent deficits in
mild PD patients, when task-switching required the appli-
cation of the same rule (i.e., naming) to different stimuli
(i.e., letters or numbers), so that only the stimulus sets
changed. Critically, dopaminergic medication withdrawal
impaired the latter lower order stimulus set switching
(Cools et al., 2001a, 2003) but did not affect the former
higher order task-switching, in which both stimulus and
response sets changed (Kehagia et al., 2009). Thus, not
all forms of switching rely on corticostriatal dopamine
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transmission. Switching between abstract rules in these
prior task-switching studies might be similar to extra-
dimensional shifting in the context of the ID/ED para-
digm. Indeed, findings from work with experimental
animals have shown that EDS is sensitive to excitotoxic
and neurochemical lesions in the pFC (McGaughy, Ross,
& Eichenbaum, 2008; Tait et al., 2007; Crofts et al., 2001;
Birrell & Brown, 2000; Roberts et al., 1994) and in the pa-
rietal cortex (Fox, Barense, & Baxter, 2003) but not in
the striatum (Crofts et al., 2001; Collins, Wilkinson, Everitt,
Robbins, & Roberts, 2000; for a review, see Robbins, 2007).
In fact, the present performance pattern strikingly resem-
bles that seen after catecholamine lesions in the pFC of
nonhuman primates (Crofts et al., 2001). In marmosets,
6-hydroxydopamine lesions of PFC, which reduce both do-
pamine and noradrenaline levels there, induced abnormal
responding that appeared disproportionately driven by
bottom–up rather than top–down attention. Specifically,
these lesions facilitated the ability to shift to a high-salient
attentional set (shape) but not to a low-salient attentional
set (line). Conversely, 6-hydroxydopamine lesions of the
striatum left EDS in marmosets unaffected. Accordingly,
the present parkinsonian failure of top–down control
over attentional sets might be mediated by fronto-parietal
cortical abnormalities in catecholamine (e.g., noradrena-
line) neurotransmitter systems (Williams-Gray, Hampshire,
Barker, & Owen, 2008; Middleton, Sharma, Agouzoul,
Sahakian, & Robbins, 1999; Rogers et al., 1999) rather than
striatal dopamine dysfunction.
These data provide a striking reinterpretation of pre-
viously observed parkinsonian set-shifting deficits, which
were interpreted to reflect differential processing of pre-
viously present dimensions, that is, LI (Slabosz et al.,
2006; Owen et al., 1993; but see Gauntlett-Gilbert et al.,
1999; Van Spaendonck et al., 1995). We found that a
group effect was present only in the PE task. In this task,
it differed as a function of the salience of a novel, newly
relevant dimension. Accordingly, the effect does not re-
flect disproportionate PE to a familiar, previously relevant
dimension. In addition, there was no group effect in the
LI task, indicating that it also does not reflect dispropor-
tionate LI of a previously irrelevant, now relevant dimen-
sion. Thus, the abnormality does not reflect a problem
with shifting per se, but rather it reflects disproportionate
control by bottom–up attention, which becomes evident
most readily when tasks require shifting to a low-salient
dimension. Indeed, the abnormality was expressed as an
enhanced tendency to shift when the postshift dimen-
sion was high salient.
The lack of enhanced LI in the present study is appar-
ently inconsistent with the previous observation that PD
patients exhibited impairment on LI tasks (Slabosz et al.,
2006; Owen et al., 1993). However, the hypothesis that
PD is characterized by enhanced LI has long been controver-
sial. Various other studies have obtained data inconsistent
with this conclusion (Myers et al., 2003; Gauntlett-Gilbert
et al., 1999; Van Spaendonck et al., 1995). In fact, Myers
et al. (2003) have observed that PD patients (but not pa-
tients with medial-temporal lobe lesions) exhibit better
rather than poorer shifting to a previously exposed (and
irrelevant) dimension relative to a dimension to which sub-
jects had not been exposed. Our data suggest that the
previously observed effects of PD on LI tasks reflect ef-
fects of dimensional salience. Learned irrelevance usually
reduces the salience of the previously irrelevant, now rel-
evant dimension (Slabosz et al., 2006). It is possible that
this effect did not surface in the present study (and other
prior studies; e.g., Myers et al., 2003) because the preshift
irrelevant dimension (and thus the postshift relevant dimen-
sion) was always “color”; this dimension was quite salient
as shown by the sorting task data. In this case, prior expo-
sure to a dimension, albeit irrelevant, might actually en-
hance rather than reduce its attention-drawing capacity
(Myers et al., 2003). The fact that the newly relevant dimen-
sion in our LI tasks was always number, which was probably
low salient, might have further attenuated a deficit in our
LI tasks.
In conclusion, we replicated attentional set-shifting def-
icits, observed previously in PD. Unlike previous studies,
the present study manipulated not only the need for over-
coming LI but also dimensional salience and thus the need
for top–down control. Results indicated that apparent set-
shifting deficits in PD do not reflect LI but rather impair-
ments in response to low-salient information. These data
should replicate in future studies, in which dimensional sa-
lience is manipulated using different dimensions and may
reconcile apparently paradoxical findings that PD patients
exhibit not only impaired attentional set shifting but also
enhanced switching to and control by salient distracting
cues in selective attention paradigms (Filoteo & Maddox,
1999; Filoteo et al., 1994, 1997; Maddox, Filoteo, Delis, &
Salmon, 1996; Henik, Singh, Beckley, & Rafal, 1993; Sharpe,
1990; Wright, Burns, Geffen, & Geffen, 1990; Flowers &
Robertson, 1985). Intriguingly, the pattern of performance
resembled that seen after catecholamine lesions in the pFC
and provides the first direct evidence for exaggerated
bottom–up and/or attenuated top–down attentional con-
trol during set shifting in PD.
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